THE SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY
as court of review
Number Pfv.E.21813/2005/2.
The
Supreme Court of the Republic of Hungary, in the case of the self-represented
plaintiff Dr György Ádám (1107 Budapest, Somfa köz 10.), who filed for retrial,
against Loránt Hegedűs Jr, represented by the barrister Dr Géza Gulyás (1022
Budapest, Bimbó u. 3. mfszt. 5.) launched at the Pest Central District Court
under number 22.P.89.634/2004., based on a consideration of a request of review
filed by the plaintiff against the Budapest City Court ruling of 20th
April, 2005, number 47.Pf.23.421/2005/3. issued the following
r u l i n g :
The
Supreme Court rejects the plaintiff's request of review.
There is
no appeal against this ruling.
J u s t i f i c a t i o n :
The
original court rejected the request of review filed by the plaintiff as one
unsuitable for a hearing of merit.
The court
of appeal ruling upheld the ruling issued by the original court.
The
plaintiff filed a request of review against the binding ruling, and requested
that the ruling be nullified, citing a breach of law.
Under
paragraph (1) of section 270 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law a request of
review may be filed against a binding ruling to the Supreme Court by the party,
the interferer and those – with regard to parts of the ruling applicable to
them – who are affected by an order of the ruling.
Of
binding rulings issued in civilian cases only a binding verdict (partial,
supplementary and intermediary verdicts) may be attacked by a request of
review, as a court always delivers a verdict in the merits of the case
(paragraph (1) of section 212 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law). Therefore the
binding ruling delivered in the merits of the case as cited in paragraph
(1) of section 270 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law can only be a ruling
issued in a non-trial procedure.
The
ruling issued in the trial procedure attacked by the plaintiff filing for
retrial cannot be regarded as a binding ruling delivered in the merits of the
case, against which there is recourse to a request of review.
Therefore
the Supreme Court has rejected the plaintiff filing for retrial under paragraph
(1) of section 273 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law.
No.
Pfv.E.21813/2005/2.
Given
that the Supreme Court rejected the request of review on a technical point it
did not have to rule in the matter of legal costs (point a) of paragraph (1) of
section 57 of the 93rd Act of 1990).
The Court
of Constitution nullified the first sentence of paragraph (5) of section 273 of
the Code of Civilian Trial Law with its ruling 42/2004. (XI.9.), thus
abolishing the stipulation that there is no appeal against the rulings issued
by the judge. The Civil Code, however, contains no stipulations which could
form a basis for an appeal against a ruling issued by the Supreme Court in a
preliminary consideration of a request of review. Therefore the Supreme Court –
on the basis of subsection B of section 275 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law,
and paragraph (2) of section 222 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law, and
paragraph (3) of section 220 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law – informs the
party requesting the review that there is no appeal against the current ruling.
3rd
October, 2005 Budapest
Dr
Judit Demeter, by her own hand.
Judge
To
certify: Ms V
secretary
To the Civilian College of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Hungary.
Ref. no.: Pfv.E.21.813/2005/2.
I, the plaintiff Dr György Ádám, in
my civilian lawsuit filed against Loránt Hegedűs Jr, received on 14th
October, 2005 the Supreme Court's "ruling" issued on behalf of the
Supreme Court as court of review by Judge Dr Judit Demeter on 3rd
October, 2005. The "ruling" is in breach of the law, it is
unacceptable in an independent democratic state of law and must therefore be
overturned.
For all these reasons I present the Civilian College of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Hungary with the following
s u b m i s s i o n :
I request that the ruling issued by
a single Judge, reference number as above, be nullified and that the Supreme
Court hear the MERITS of the lawsuit!
J u s t i f i c a t i o n :
I.
Under paragraph (1) of section 8 of
the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary: "The Republic of Hungary
recognises the unbreachable and inalienable rights of man, to honour and
protect these is the state's primary obligation".
This passage of the Constitution was
disregarded by nine Judges out of ten – when issuing rulings in the course of
the above lawsuit – in the judiciary system of the Republic of Hungary: my
unbreachable and inalienable right was not honoured or protected.
My lawsuit's essential purpose was
to seek the "protection" (and therefore honouring) of my fundamental
– and thus unbreachable and inalienable – rights by the Hungarian judiciary.
In my lawsuit and its supplements,
furthermore in my subsequent submissions I PROVED (!) how the defendant's plea
to the "Christian Hungarian State!" breached my fundamental rights,
which the Hungarian State – like every independent democratic state of law – must
honour and protect.
The defendant's "plea"
claims that Jews (prehistoric man come alive) – who came to Hungary to kick the
Hungarians once more – must be excluded. The exclusion of Jews – as a commonly
known expression – is a hateful incitement used by anti-Semites and known for a
hundred years, which stands for murder or deportation to a desert island
(etc.).
This claim can be proven with a
single example: In 1933 in the Netherlands an anti-Semite – by name Egon van
Winghene – wrote a book in German, entitled "Where Do We Put the
Jews?". The book was translated into Hungarian by István Szabó in 1935.
The following can be read on page 65 of the work: "Now what does
experience teach us? We are not helped by exclusion, or by national
assimilation, or by sporadic numerus clausus, or by the ghetto, or by minority
rights and above all not by two-faced pseudo-Zionism! To solve the Jewish
question in a single Aryan nation, that is in a geographically restricted area
– as it is the ambition of most nationalists – is similarly impossible.
There are only two ways radically to
solve the Jewish question:
1) The bodily destruction and
extermination of the alien nation, identified as dangerous. This is hardly
a viable way forward for the struggle. I have suggested that the pan-Aryan
attitude rejects this possibility. Why, if we were to exterminate all
Jews in Switzerland or in Romania, to the last man, we would not bring the
question any closer to a solution. Brothers of Guggenheims and Cohens in Prague
and Warsaw, the relatives of Fruchtermanns and Menasches in Odessa and
Budapest, and especially the Pollacks and Rotths in Vienna and Berlin will
ensure the necessary replacements and spawn. Partial pogroms only make martyrs.
The extermination of a 27 million-strong nation, which lives dispersed in so
many countries, is furthermore technically impossible.
2.) One hundred per cent complete
exclusion. This is the only possible way, however hard it may be. Only the
complete, one hundred per cent Zionism can help us. Such Zionism must be openly
adopted at last by us Aryans. Let us get this clear, perfect Zionism,
that is the full exclusion of Jews, as the most dangerous enemy of our
culture, and the forced relocation of Jews and those of Jewish origin in a
country to be established for them – and a concurrent abolition of all their
rights in all Aryan countries.
Jews will not let us in peace, until
we tolerate them in our midst, we must ensure that they are physically and technically
not in a position to implant in us their destructive, putrefying spirit via
assimilation and emancipation.
Even the ghetto – this reasonable
and laudable protective system of sober mediaeval times – is a blunted sword,
which created a fudged situation. Thus one day, through cunning and deception
the walls "unjustly opposed to the religious equality of Jews" were
destroyed and it was allowed that the enclosed wolves freely attack the flock
of innocents suspecting no evil (see the accursed French revolution, the
decrees of Casmir the Great, Cromwell and Napoleon). (page 65.)
The books was published in a reprint
version in 2002 by the "Gede Testvérek Bt" in Hungary, it is
available in thousands of copies to be purchased in countless book shops.
The above quote can clarify it to
everyone – if they do not yet know – what the EXCLUSION of Jews means (a
radical solution to the Jewish problem, point two).
The “proposal” of the “exclusion” of
Jews, as set down in the defendant’s writing, is a precisely defined notion,
namely: the most despicable mass murder, or deportation to death camps known in
the history of humankind. The defendant is a “Christian priest” whose
incitements have been seriously considered by the Hungarian State for a
thousand years. This inspired amongst others the Jewish laws of 1938-1944,
which is my greatest family tragedy. This is why I filed the lawsuit!
The Hungarian State does not
consider equally the “Christian priest’s” repeated calls to “exclusion” (murder
or deportation) and my request of the Hungarian State to provide protection
(paragraph (1) of section 8 of the Constitution). I, in spite of all this, did
not ask anything else of the Hungarian judiciary, but that it establishes that
the defendant breached my personal rights (point a.) of paragraph (1) of
section 84 of the Civil Code) and to ban him from repeating the offence (point
b.)).
The Hungarian State REFUSES EVEN
TO do so much to protect my constitutional rights against the “Christian
Hungarian priest”, while the proportion of the defendant’s incitement to
exclusion is a million times graver than my most modest request of the
Hungarian State’s judiciary.
Let me note that the above are not
“new pieces of evidence” but another aspect of the statement so often proven by
me, because my statements set down in the lawsuit were rejected by the Court of
Appeals ruling and a series of other – gravely illegal – rulings citing new and
again new “arguments”. I – bound by the obligation to provide evidence – must
bring new arguments against the increasingly illogical, yet persistent
“justifications” for the rejection of my lawsuit.
Under the Constitution the judiciary
of the Hungarian State should have considered the following stipulations when
delivering its verdict:
–
–
Constitution, paragraph
(1) of section 55. “In the Republic of Hungary everyone has the right to
…personal safety”
–
–
Constitution paragraph
(1) section 57. “In the Republic of Hungary all are equal before the court...”
furthermore paragraph (5): “As set down in law, in the Republic of Hungary
everyone has legal recourse against a court decision, which is in breach of
their rights.”
–
–
According to paragraph
(1) of section 61 of the Constitution: “In the Republic of Hungary everyone has
the right to freedom of expression of opinion...” The obvious limitation of
this freedom is determined by paragraph (1) of section 54 of the Constitution,
which states: “In the Republic of Hungary everyone has the right, from birth...
to human dignity, which cannot be stripped arbitrarily from anyone.” In the
course of the trial I have repeatedly proven that in the “manifesto” of the
defendant, by way of incitement to exclusion and other slanderous allegations
he has repeatedly breached my right to human dignity, and cannot invoke his
right set down in paragraph (1) of section 61 of the Constitution with
reference to his manifesto addressed to the “Christian Hungarian State!”. With
reference to this writing, inciting to exclusion (etc.) – if the person whose
personal rights were breached files a lawsuit – the Hungarian judiciary must
establish a breach of the law.
My note to the above: under
paragraph (1) of section 57 of the Constitution, “in keeping with the
stipulations of the law” a serious injury was inflicted by the Supreme Court
allowing a case of such weight to be ... seemingly!... finally rejected by a
single Judge, in the form of a ruling (without justification).
When evaluating the case paragraph
(2) of section 8 of the Constitution must be considered, which states that “the
essential contents of fundamental rights... cannot even be altered by law.”
On the basis of all these the ref.
no. Pfv.E.21.813/2005/2. of the single Judge of the Supreme Court is – de jure
– void.
II.
While I proved in part I of my
justification that the “ruling” issued by the Supreme Court on 3rd
October, 2005, is void, for the sake of precision I shall analyse how the
ruling is gravely illegal in terms of trial law, in other words why it is void.
In the
final paragraph of its first page the ruling quotes paragraph (1) of section
270 of the Code of Civilian Trial Law: “Under paragraph (1) of section 270 of
the Code of Civilian Trial Law a request of review may be filed against a
binding ruling to the Supreme Court by the party, the interferer and those –
with regard to parts of the ruling applicable to them – who are affected by an
order of the ruling.”
The text of the law includes
expressis verbis the legal situation of “binding ruling” as matter of fact.
Subsequently the first and second
paragraphs of page two of the ruling says: “Of binding rulings issued in
civilian cases only a binding verdict (partial, supplementary and intermediary
verdicts) may be attacked by a request of review, as a court always delivers a
verdict in the merits of the case (paragraph (1) of section 212 of the Code of
Civilian Trial Law). Therefore the binding ruling delivered in the merits of
the case as cited in paragraph (1) of section 270 of the Code of Civilian
Trial Law can only be a ruling issued in a non-trial procedure”
This assertion of the ruling is a
serious legal error. According to paragraph (1) of section 212 of the Code of
Civilian Trial Law: “The court will decide the merits of a case with a verdict,
in every other matter arising in the course of the lawsuit – including the
termination of the lawsuit – decisions will take the form of rulings.”
The “including” term was interpreted
by the Judge sophistically. The legislator understood the term to mean that the
ruling terminating the lawsuit – while a decision of MERIT (this cannot be
interpreted in any other way) – takes the form of a ruling, but against this –
because it is a ruling of merit – there is no legal recourse. Nowhere does the
Code of Civilian Trial Law say that a ruling terminating a lawsuit – because it
is a ruling and not a verdict – cannot be a decision of merit.
The term “érdemi” (translated as “of
merit”) is, according to the Hungarian dictionary (Akadémiai Kiadó Vol II.,
1960. p. 412.): “Regarding the merit, essence of something, meritorious,
essential. Hearing of merits (law)”. This is how the “of merit” expression is
to be understood according to the dictionary of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences. The ruling declaring the termination of the lawsuit therefore can
only be a ruling “of merit”.
The term “including” serves the very
purpose of differentiating from rulings other than those of merits, thus
precisely that the “ruling” - contrarily – is of merit “therefore” (a term used
by the Judge issuing the ruling) a legally binding ruling issued in the merits
of a case, against which there is legal recourse!
On the basis of all this I request
that the Civilian College of the Supreme Court to hold a hearing to decide the
merits of the request of review, as set down in paragraph (2) of section 274 of
the Code of Civilian Trial Law – because the rejection of the request of review
is illegal with regard to a hearing of the merits of the case. I request that
the Pfv. IV council of the Supreme Court is excluded from the handling of the
case, as set down in point e.) of paragraph (1) of section 13 of the Code of
Civilian Trial Law, as Dr Mátyás Mészáros and Dr Judit Demeter (the two Judges
acting in the matter) have already taken decisions in the case, and their
objective consideration of the case cannot be expected.
III.
In my lawsuit I emphatically
stressed that I do not regard myself as either of Jewish origins or of the
Israelite faith, I have been a materialist all my life. This, however, never
interested anyone, I have always been regarded as a Jew, which is why I was
affected by the numerus clausus, forced labour, deportation to death camps, the
murder of my younger brothers, and since then – unrelenting in the third
millennium – the “Jew-baiting” directed against me.
I won the trial on 1st
July, 2003 – at the original court – with the excellent, expert verdict
20.P.85.346/2003/10 of Dr György Mohay of the Pest Central District Court.
Never since then has anyone written down what – so to speak – was wrong with
the excellent, just verdict. Therefore I hold this verdict to be the only
meritorious – and in this respect – binding verdict in the case.
–
–
As a result of an
appeal by the defendant the trial went to the Budapest City Court as Court of
Appeal, where the late chairwoman Dr Mrs Andrásné Felkai, Judge Dr Tibor Tóth
and Judge Dr Laura Salamon ruled on (or against) my lawsuit. The contents were never considered, they
cited Ruling 13 of the Civilian College of the Supreme Court illegally and
asked four questions in the verdict (of who I know not), thus they rejected my
lawsuit for purely formal reasons on 26th February, 2004 under
number F.B. 52. Pf. 29.063/2003/4.
–
I then filed a request of review, with a detailed argument showing the
grave breaches of the law by the court of appeals, and I asked for a verdict in
the merits (!) of the case. My request was rejected by the Supreme
Court's single judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros under number Pfv.E.21.020/2004/2 on 25th
May, 2004, arguing that under an amendment of the Code of Civilian Trial Law,
which came into force on 1st January, 2002 (105th Act of
2001) a request of review may be filed if the ruling to be reviewed is in
breach of law with regard to the consideration of the MERITS of the case, and
if the ruling was in conflict with the Supreme Court's general legal rulings…
The ruling rejected my request of review for two reasons
–
–
under sections 75-85 of
the Civil Code my DIRECT (!) involvement could not be established (this is, by
the way, not required by sections 75-85 of the Civil Code)
–
–
according to a
theoretical ruling published under number 2002/2/740 of the official anthology
of Supreme Court rulings the protection of personal rights may only be availed
of if an act can be established as being in connection with a specific
person. The theoretical decision 2002/2/740 of the Civilian College deals with
the rejection of a plaintiff where a person complained that his surname was the
same as the name of a toilet paper manufactured by the defendant. This
reasoning, which claims that I cannot go to trial about the tragedy of my life
– although the defendant has called from my exclusion – because another
plaintiff felt hurt by sharing a name with a brand of toilet paper. This
injures me to such an extent that I requested the chairman of the Supreme Court
to initiate a disciplinary hearing against Mátyás Mészáros, which request the
chairman of the Supreme Court indirectly refused. The ruling cited another
verdict, it claimed that the L.B.Pfv. IV.20.299/2004/2. verdict established the
same thing. But this verdict was not published in the official anthology of the
Supreme Court's rulings, therefore this citation too, is seriously in breach of
the law.
– After all this I submitted a request of retrial to the Pest Central
District Court, which rejected on 9th December 2004 in ruling
22.P.89.634/2004/4. by Dr Attila Gáspár. The illegal ruling claims that some of
my submissions were not new, while some submissions could have been presented
in the original trial, and the issue of whether there is legal recourse is a
question of law, therefore cannot form the basis of a retrial.
The
reasons were legal and factual errors, which I discussed in detail in my appeal
against the ruling.
What
is put forward then by the ruling rejecting retrial at the original court?
a.)
a.) the facts presented by me are not
new
b.)
b.) I could have cited the new facts in
the original trial
c.)
c.) the lack of legal recourse is a
question of law and not of fact. A question of law cannot form a basis for a
retrial.
My
opinion of all this:
ad
a.) Indeed, some of the facts presented in the request of retrial were “not
new” in a very narrow interpretation of the expression, but they were so
twisted, misinterpreted or confused by the judge acting in the court of appeals
in his verdict FB.52.Pf.29.063/2003/4. to such an extent that in my request of
review and my request of retrial I had to correct them, reinterpret some of my
statements, therefore IN THIS RESPECT they were new, which I could not present
in the “original proceedings” – being unaware of future distortions – but made
abundantly clear in the trial documentation. The number of questions of fact
and law a court can raise is infinite. Thus the judge rejecting my
request of retrial wants me to submit an INFINITE number of questions of fact
and law in the original trial??? Nothing can be added to this impossible claim.
This is thus no reason to reject my request of retrial. This is the judge's
extreme bias – against me.
ad
b.) Indeed I could have cited the “new facts” in the original proceedings
as well, had I been a fortune teller and a mind reader.
Unfortunately I am neither, but my lawsuit should not have been rejected. The
reason: If I had known in advance that the different courts (for example the
Pf.52.F.B.) will ask impossible things, and cite the Civilian College of the
Supreme Court's ruling 13, and that I am not DIRECTLY recognisable from the
writing, I could have indeed presented all these facts earlier... if I expected
these absurd and impossible reasons – which were cited to reject my lawsuit –
to be brought up by the courts. The serious errors and breaches of law by the
courts are reversed in the ruling by judge, and attributed to me as my
“errors”. It is, however, indubitable that the analogy of paragraph (4) of
section 4 of the Civil Code is applicable here: a judge delivering a verdict
can never cite a cause attributable to him or her as justification of a
verdict.
ad.c.)
The question of “legal recourse” - simply in itself – can be a question of
fact, or equally a question of law. It all depends whether the existence or
lack of “legal recourse” is based on what elements (facts or law). In the
current case – according to the judge – I have no legal recourse, because on
the basis of the defendant's writing one cannot directly refer to me the
incitement to hateful exclusion. It is, however – as I proved – a QUESTION OF
FACT whether I TOO (!) am personally recognisable from the writing!
Seventeen witnesses put it in writing that they recognised me. The “legal
recourse” in this dispute is a question of fact, not of law, therefore can
form the basis of a retrial!
Furthermore,
I state that in my appeal against the court of appeals verdict, and my four
submissions I discussed how one deduces, moving from the general to the
individual, using deductive syllogism, which was NOT CONSIDERED BY ANY JUDGE,
they did not even refer to it, when it was the decisive piece of evidence
proving that I HAVE LEGAL RECOURSE. (By the way: this manoeuvre of logic can be
performed by a six-year old, they just don't know what it is called, while the
court consistently – but seriously illegally – ignored it.) Moreover, my
lawsuit conformed to every stipulation of sections 121-123 of Chapter VI of the
Code of Civilian Trial Law, and the Court, under paragraph (2) of section 3 of
the Code of Civilian Trial Law the court is bound to the lawsuit, therefore if
the lawsuit is in compliance with the necessary requirements, the court is
bound to take it as a basis: the rules of logic are included!
This
is none other than the reversal of the burden of proof, therefore not a verdict
delivered by an independent, democratic state of law, but the procedure of an
Inquisition in the third millennium in the civilised world.
– I filed an appeal against the
rejection by ruling of my request of retrial. The Court of Appeal delivered the
F.B.47.Pfv.23.421/2005/3. verdict WITHOUT HEARING on 20th April,
2005, with chairwoman Dr Mrs Tibor Kosztyu, Dr Judit Viola and Dr Mrs Béla Gál.
The court of appeals procedure against retrial of my lawsuit
– a ruling based entirely in formal matters of trial law – was fatally illegal.
–
–
The Court of Appeals in
the retrial request claims in paragraph 3 of page 2 that the “protection of
rights is limited to the person who is UNEQUIVOCALLY identified.” I, applying
the rules of logic PROVED that logically, using deductive syllogism (by
deducing from the general to the specific) my person can be unequivocally
“identified”. As I was excluded from the hearing, I could not cite the
unequivocal rules of logic, but the F.B. 47.Pfv. council ignored it entirely in
their justification.
–
–
Again the
“justification” included the Civilian College of the Supreme Court's ruling 13,
which – because it refers exclusively to corrections in the press –
cannot be applied in my lawsuit, but I proved that even under an illegally
applied ruling 13 my “person can in other ways” be recognised. The appeals
decision by the Budapest City Court ignored this too, in its illegal procedure.
–
–
The ruling ignored
entirely that I brought seventeen witnesses to prove: they recognised my person
from the writing of the defendant. This entirely evident item of evidence was
excluded from the admissible pieces of evidence with a wholly illogical
justification on the first page, in the fourth paragraph from the bottom... I
remain ignorant of why, the “justification” is completely confused.
–
–
The F.B.47.Pfv. Court,
in the justification of its ruling of rejection, again included such elements
in paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code, which are not included in any
law (the whole second page dealt with this). The ruling inserts that the
writing must refer to a person INDIVIDUALLY and DIRECT
involvement must apply, and SPECIFICALLY!
–
–
The F.B. 47.Pfv.
council then states that “the article, which forms the basis of the complaint,
did not name the plaintiff, his person was not INDIVIDUALLY referred to, the
piece includes such generalisation, which rendered the person of the
plaintiff unrecognisable.” It is impossible to understand how 17 witnesses
still arrived at recognising me?
–
–
To conclude, the
F.B.47.Pfv. council states the following in the ruling: “The Court of Appeals
feels the arguments cited by the plaintiff at best prove that others in general
believe him to be of a social group or community of which the writing, which
forms basis of the complaint, is about, this however does not mean that at the
same time the indispensable condition was met, that the direct involvement, or
personal identifiability of the plaintiff entered the awareness of others, and
that this was expressed, as such an assertion that he was personally
recognisable as a member of the group or community, could not be made.” This
part of the justification is a classic example of a logical self-contradiction.
If the “argument cited” (the written statement of seventeen witnesses) serves
to prove that others, in general believe him to be belonging to that
group (?), of which the writing, which forms basis of the complaint, is about,
this however does not mean that at the same time the INDISPENSABLE (?)
condition was ALSO (?) met that the defendant's
INDIVIDUAL
DIRECT
involvement
PERSONAL
IDENTIFIABILITY ENTERED
THE AWARENESS of others AS WELL... !
My questions:
–
–
If such an assertion
could be made, why did seventeen people do so? This means that such an
assertion could be made!
–
–
What legal situations
are those that were included in paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code
(individual, direct involvement), where does the Civil Code prescribe these?
On the basis of all these the ruling issued by the F.B.
47.Pfv. council is illegal to such an extent that it no longer constitutes a
ruling in an independent democratic state of law.
–
–
I have submitted a
request of review against the gravely illegal ruling of the F.B. Pfv. 47.
council, which ignores the elementary rules of logics (eg. deductive
syllogism), which was rejected in ruling Pfv.E.21.813/2005/2 by a single judge.
I have analysed this in detail in part I of my present submission, and proved
that it was illogical and illegal. It is not necessary to repeat that analysis.
IV.
So far ten judged have participated
in my trial, issuing rulings. These are in order:
Rulings:
1.)
1.) Dr György Mohay verdict
PKKB.20.P.85.346/2003/10. on 1st July, 2003.
2.)
2.) Dr Mrs András Felkai, chairwoman, Dr
Tibor Tóth, Dr Laura Salamon verdict
F.B, as court of appeal 52.Pf.29.063/2003/4. 26th
February 2004.
3.) Dr Mátyás Mészáros ruling
L.B.Pfv.E.21.020/2004/2. 25th May, 2004.
4.) Dr Attila Gáspár ruling
PKKB. 22.P.89.634/2004/4. 9th December, 2004.
5.) Dr Mrs Tibor Kosztyu chairwoman,
Dr Judit Vida, Dr Mrs Béla Gál verdict 47.Pfv.23.421/2005/3. 20th
April, 2005.
6.) Dr Judit Demeter ruling
L.B.Pfv.E. 21.813/2005/2. 3rd October 2005.
3.)
It must be noted here that a
criminal trial was also ongoing against Loránt Hegedűs Jr. The original court, chaired by criminal
justice Dr László Szebeni and two co-chairs handed down a sentence of a year
and six months in prison, suspended for three years probation on 6th
December 2002, with the 13.B.423/2002/7. verdict. At the Budapest Criminal
Court he was acquitted with verdict 3.Bf.111/2003/10. An argument amongst
others was that “the defendant stated” Exclude the Jews, for if you don't, they
will exclude you. This statement assumes a mutual relationship. However, Jews
are not aggressive, but a peaceful, tame people, the mutual relationship is not
fulfilled, the defendant thus does not desire their exclusion. This means that
if the Jews were aggressive, the defendant would be guilty. It was after this
that his faithful carried him with roars of triumph from the Supreme Court's
Markó utca building. This is how the Hungarian judiciary rules in this day and
age.
Of the ten judges – delivering a
ruling in the trial – only one, Dr György Mohay issued a verdict on the merits
of the trial. His verdict was an excellent, scientific reasoning, faultless in
terms of both law and logics.
The other nine judges cited
illogical trial law – thus formal - “arguments” to reject my lawsuit, thus
never addressed the merits of my lawsuit: they followed the defendant's
writing's plea, making their own the legal continuance of a thousand years of
Hungarian Statehood. Thus existentially “complying” with the Supreme Court
chairman's feelings on the Hungarianness reaching to the very roots of
Christianity (see my writing in the legal documentation: “Sacral “sins,” material
punishments”).
Let me note that the judges delivering rulings
in the case had an extraordinarily easy task when rejecting the lawsuit. They
did not have to engage in an actual debate of legal facts, knowing that the
last word, like it or not, rests with them. The party presenting their
arguments in a legal dispute is in a contrary position, because what legal
arguments are accepted are up to the judge, when considering the merits and
delivering a ruling based in their convictions. The “conviction” of the
mentioned nine judges was obviously that their personal existence was primary,
and the opinion of the disputing party could be “waved aside” with a formal
ruling... they acted accordingly.
According to this attitude, what the
“Christian Hungarian priest” says is obligatory for the faithful, like the
“holy writ”. Namely that the Jews:
–
–
are prehistoric man
made flesh
–
–
have lost Zion for
their crimes against God,
–
–
have come to the shores
of the Danube to kicks once more into the Hungarians,
–
–
EXCLUDE THEM!
Nine Hungarian judges did not accept
this as the breach of personal rights. This is yet another humiliation I suffer
at the hands of the “Christian Hungarian State!” – this time at the hands of
the third branch of government, the judiciary. It cannot be compared to the
degradations I suffered between 1938 and May 1945, but indubitably a
continuation of it. I filed my lawsuit because – although the fact that my
personal rights were breached by the defendant and his writings had been
affirmed by thousands – I felt it necessary that a reputable institution in Hungary – the Court – also
affirmed this. The Hungarian Court has failed to affirm it in a binding
verdict, but it did prove that it is not a reputable institution. I have put
all this in writing and uploaded to the internet (including the present
submission) in Hungarian and English language versions (www.jog-vita.hu.). The trial – thus – is followed
throughout the civilised world: the USA, Canada, the UK, the Netherlands,
Israel (Yad Wasem), etc. and I have already received feedback.
To the
Civilian College of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Hungary!
I request that on the basis of the
merits of my present submission my request for retrial be considered in a
hearing of its merits, with the exclusion of the Pfv. IV council.
Budapest,
10th November, 2005.
Dr
György Ádám
plaintiff, barrister